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I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring that a defendant is competent to stand trial is essential for a fair
justice system.
The criteria for determining a defendant’s mental
competence to stand trial has long been a contentious issue in the
jurisprudence of both the United Kingdom and the United States. As it is
impossible to see into a person’s mind and unjust to allow a mentally
incompetent defendant to stand trial, the determination of mental
incompetence has been left to the court.1
This Note takes the position that, like the United Kingdom has already
done, the United States should be re-evaluating its outdated standard in
determining competence to stand trial and its implications for selfrepresentation. This Note will first discuss and evaluate the background and
history of the standards used to determine whether a defendant is fit to enter
a plea and competent to stand trial in the U.K. and U.S. Second, this Note
will discuss the U.K. Law Commission’s Unfitness to Plead Consultation
Paper and its rationale for changing the current standard. Third, this Note
will analyze and discuss problematic court interpretations of Dusky v. United
States and the negative impacts of that case on the U.S.’s judicial system,
especially in regard to self-representation. Finally, this Note will argue that
adopting the decision-making capacity test set forth in the U.K.’s
Consultation Paper would be a positive and practical step towards bringing
U.S. competency evaluation in line with modern psychiatry and the modern
trial process.
II. CURRENT COMPETENCE EVALUATION STANDARDS
On August 16, 2013, a U.K. court decided that sterilization was in a
mentally disabled man’s (DE) best interests.2 In reaching this controversial
decision, the court extensively evaluated DE’s capacity and best interests,
taking into account context and circumstances under the Mental Capacity
Act of 2005 (MCA).3 Factors such as the history of DE’s disability,4 the

1
JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 611 (5th ed. 2009) (stating
that the issue of incompetency is ordinarily considered at the defendant’s initial appearance
before a magistrate, but may be raised at any time during the proceedings or during the trial).
2
NHS Trust v. DE, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 2562 [2].
3
Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9 (U.K.).
4
NHS Trust v. DE, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 2562 [2].
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nature of his disability, his local disability services,5 DE’s personality,6 his
wishes and feelings,7 and the consequences of a further pregnancy from DE’s
longtime girlfriend on DE’s life8 were taken into account for his competency
evaluation. The MCA gives extensive direction on how to determine
whether a person lacks capacity in order to ensure that a just decision is
made.9
Since its passage in 2005, the MCA has been hailed as welcome and
progressive legislation.10
Due to the MCA’s general success in
determinations regarding capacity in non-criminal contexts, the U.K. Law
Commission11 decided to research and issue a formal Consultation Paper that
suggests a new legal test for fitness to plead in criminal cases based on
Section 3 of the MCA.12 This resulted in a proposal to Parliament to extend
the MCA’s test to the criminal realm.
The U.K. Law Commission’s Consultation Paper highlights the problems
resulting from a vague standard for evaluating a defendant’s mental
competence and fitness to plead. The U.K.’s current standard is based on an
outdated case from 1836, R v. Pritchard.13 The Pritchard standard states that
a defendant is fit to plead if the defendant “is of sufficient intellect to
comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to make a proper
defen[s]e—to know that he may challenge any of you to whom he may
object—and to comprehend the details of the evidence.”14 Due to
problematic and varying interpretations of this standard, the U.K. Law
Commission’s submitted a formal paper calling for changes to the Pritchard
standard so that it is consistent with “modern psychiatric thinking and with
the modern trial process.”15

5

Id.
Id. ¶ 36.
7
Id. ¶ 42.
8
Id. ¶ 63.
9
Mental Capacity Act, supra note 3, at Part 1.
10
THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON
THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005, VALUING EVERY VOICE, RESPECTING EVERY RIGHT:
MAKING THE CASE FOR THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT, 2014, Cm. 8884, at 3 (U.K.).
11
The U.K. Law Commission is an independent legislative body created by the Parliament.
12
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, Unfitness to Plead (Consultation Paper No. 197,780, 2010),
available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp197_Unfitness_to_Plead_consultation.
pdf.
13
R v. Pritchard, [1836] 173 Eng. Rep. 135.
14
Id.
15
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 1.15.
6
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The U.S. fitness/competency standard is comparably vague. The U.S.’s
competence to stand trial standard comes from Dusky v. United States, which
states that evaluation of competence is based on “whether [the defendant] has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceeding against him.”16
This standard has caused confusion and varying interpretations, especially
in regards to self-representation and waiver of counsel.17 Due to these
conflicting interpretations, some have called for a “revamping” of
jurisprudence regarding waiver of counsel.18 Others call for a modification
of the Dusky standard for clarification and guidance.19
III. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: A HISTORY OF TWO NATIONS
A. Capacity in a Just Judicial System
“To punish a man who lacks the power to reason is as undignified and
unworthy as punishing an inanimate object or an animal. A man who cannot
reason cannot be subject to blame. Our collective conscience does not allow
punishment where it cannot impose blame.”20 This quote from Holloway v.
United States, stands for the proposition that there is an inherent fairness
issue in allowing an incompetent defendant to stand trial. In the U.S. and the
U.K., the law is clear that a criminal defendant has a fundamental right not to
be tried, convicted, or sentenced while incompetent.21 This follows from the
rationale that everyone is entitled to and deserves a fair trial.22

16

362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta, Godinez and
Edwards, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 391, 398 (2009) (contending that “the barebones Dusky test
leaves much unanswered.” For example, the test does not specify the degree or type of
communication necessary to meet the standard for capacity.).
18
Id. at 410.
19
Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 313, 347 (2009).
20
Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666–67 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
21
See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171 (1975); R. v. Pritchard, [1836] 173 Eng. Rep. 135; Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act
1964 §§ 4 and 4A, as amended by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead)
Act 1991.
22
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17
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1. Current Fitness to Plead Standard—United Kingdom
The current legal test for fitness to plead in the U.K. comes from the 1836
case of R v. Pritchard.23 This case involved a deaf and mute defendant
charged with bestiality.24 The jury was directed to find the defendant unfit to
plead if they found that there was no realistic form of communication that
would allow the prisoner to clearly understand the trial and be able to
properly make a defense to the charge.25 R v. Davies26 added to the
Pritchard doctrine by stating that the accused must also be able to instruct
counsel.27 Together Pritchard and Davies set forth the following criteria to
evaluate the question of fitness: “the ability to plead to the indictment, to
understand the course of the proceedings, to instruct a lawyer, to challenge a
juror and to understand the evidence.”28
The Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act of 1991
added that a judge may find an accused unfit to plead; however, a jury will
still be required to decide whether the defendant “did the act or made the
omission charged against him as the offen[s]e.”29
2. Current Competence to Stand Trial Standard—United States
The common law standard in the United States for determining
competency to stand trial is largely governed by a few landmark Supreme
Court cases. The most important, Dusky v. United States, provides the twoprong test that has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions.30
Under the Dusky standard, a defendant is generally found to be
incompetent to stand trial if he or she does not have sufficient present ability
to consult a lawyer “with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and
if he or she does not have a “rational as well as factual understanding” of the
proceedings against him or her.31 If the parties disagree that the defendant is
incompetent, the judge will usually appoint one mental health professional to
23

173 Eng. Rep. at 303.
Id.
25
Id.
26
[1975] 1 QB 691.
27
Helen Howard, Unfitness to Plead and the Vulnerable Defendant: An Examination of the
Law Commission’s Proposals for a New Capacity Test, 75 J. CRIM. L. 194, 195 (2011).
28
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.46.
29
Howard, supra note 27, at 195.
30
362 U.S. 402 (1960).
31
Id.
24
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examine the defendant.32 A state may assume that defendants are competent
to stand trial and require them to prove incompetency based on a
preponderance of evidence.33
In 1993, the Supreme Court added to the competency jurisprudence in
Godinez v. Moran,34 holding that the competency standard for pleading
guilty or waiving the right to counsel is “the same as the competency
standard for standing trial: whether the defendant has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him,”35 otherwise known as the Dusky standard.
In 2008, the Court clarified its position on waiver of counsel in Indiana v.
Edwards,36 holding that the U.S. Constitution “permits states to insist upon
representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under
Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they
are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”37 In essence,
Indiana v. Edwards contradictorily held that the standard for competency to
stand trial was separate from the standard for competency to represent
oneself. Critics of the Edwards decision, such as criminal law professor
Joanmarie Davoli, argue that instead of acknowledging that the competency
to stand trial standard is “woefully inadequate,” the Court carved out an
exception.38 This exception allows a criminal defendant to be found
competent to stand trial, waive counsel, or enter a guilty plea, but still be
found incompetent to represent himself at trial.39 Although only eight states
have adopted the Dusky standard verbatim, the majority of jurisdictions in
the U.S. have adopted a similar version of the two prong Dusky test.40
Dusky is still at the forefront of competency jurisprudence but its
vagueness and overbreadth result in problematic interpretations.

32

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 452 (1992).
34
509 U.S. 389 (1993).
35
Id. at 389.
36
544 U.S. 164 (2008).
37
Id. at 178.
38
Davoli, supra note 19, at 323.
39
Id.
40
Alan R. Felthous, Competence to Stand Trial Should Require Rational Understanding,
39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 19, 22 (2011) (stating that “by far the most common
[competency] standard in the United States is the two-pronged [Dusky] common law
standard”).
33
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IV. U.K. LAW COMMISSION’S FORMAL CONSULTATION PAPER—UNFITNESS
TO PLEAD
The U.K. Law Commission is the statutory independent body created by
Parliament to review laws and to “recommend reform where it is needed.”41
The Law Commission aims to ensure that the law is “fair, modern, simple,
and as cost-effective as possible.”42 So far, Parliament has implemented
more than two-thirds of the Commission’s law reform recommendations.43
In 2010, the U.K. Law Commission published a formal consultation paper
titled “Unfitness to Plead.” This 268-page paper critiqued the current fitness
to plead standard found in R v. Pritchard and called for its reform.44 The
paper makes a historical, practical, and scientific argument for reform and
then strongly suggests the adoption of a new decision-making capacity
evaluation45 based on the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The next section of this
Note will discuss the Commission’s consultation papers, the Commission’s
recommendation that the Pritchard standard should be replaced, and what
the new standard should be.
A. Why the U.K. Law Commission Wants to Replace the Pritchard Standard
The Commission began by stating that the purpose of this formal
consultation paper is to “address the law on unfitness to plead and make
proposals for reforming the law in a way which is consistent with modern
psychiatric thinking and with the modern trial process.”46 The main reasons
the U.K. Law Commission want to replace the Pritchard standard are: (i) the
high threshold for fitness; (ii) reliance on low intellectual ability; (iii) lack of
a capacity requirement; and (iv) the lack of effective participation.
1. The High Threshold for Unfitness
After providing some initial legal and historical background, the U.K.
Law Commission addresses recent problematic interpretations of the

41

LAW COMMISSION, About us, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/about (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
Id.
43
LAW COMMISSION, Implementation of Our Reports, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/ourwork/implementation (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
44
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12.
45
Id. ¶ 3.13.
46
Id. ¶ 1.15.
42
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Pritchard criteria. One main critique posits that Pritchard sets too high a
threshold for a finding of unfitness. A study done by Dr. Tim Rogers and
others found that a “startlingly low” number of defendants are found to be
incompetent to stand trial.47 One author has asserted that an estimated 3,000
to 3,700 primers needed to be in a psychiatric hospital.48 Once in prison,
many of these defendants are so severely mentally ill that they may require
an immediate National Health Services (NHS) transfer.49 Dr. Rogers’s study
suggests that the low number of unfit findings results from the lack of a
uniform procedure for the screening of defendants.50 His study also found
five key difficulties in the assessment of fitness to plead.51 These issues were
summarized by the U.K. Law Commission. The first difficulty is the
inconsistent application of the legal criteria for being unfit.52 The second
stems from the fact that “fitness changes over time.” Consequently, the
accused might have been fit at the time of the assessment but was no longer
fit at the time of trial.53 The third comes from the fact that psychiatrists tend
to assess young defendants differently than adult defendants.54 Psychiatric
assessments without consideration of legal standards constitutes the fourth
difficulty. Therefore, Dr. Rogers’s study suggested that a more collaborative
approach is needed.55 The last difficulty comes from the potential for clients
to deceive their lawyers by feigning illness.56
Dr. Rogers’s study also found that many lawyers voiced concerns over
problematic omissions in the Pritchard criteria that affect the “practicalities
of the trial process.”57 These omissions include reference to memory
capacity because memory is often affected by many mental disorders.58
Other omissions of concern involve the lack of reference to decisional
competence.59 One lawyer stated, “[i]t is a very difficult situation to have
47

Tim Rogers et al., Reformulating the Law on Fitness to Plead: A Qualitative Study, 20 J.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 815, 816 (2009).
48
DORA RICKFORD & KIMMETT EDGAR, TROUBLED INSIDE: RESPONDING TO THE MENTAL
HEALTH NEEDS OF MEN IN PRISON 2 (2005).
49
Rogers et al., supra note 47, at 817.
50
Id. at 816.
51
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.63.
52
Id. ¶ 2.64.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. ¶ 2.65.
58
Id. ¶ 2.65(3).
59
Id. ¶ 2.65(4).
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someone who cannot understand what is good for them, even after
advice . . . they are at great risk of alienating the jury, alienating the judge or
being convicted where they might not otherwise be.”60 According to the
lawyers in the Rogers study, another troubling omission is the Pritchard
test’s failure to consider the cultural background of a defendant.61 For
example, one attorney-participant gave an example of this failure:
One young man that raised anxiety in my mind was seventeen,
from Eastern Europe and had seen his parents murdered. He
had literally lived on his own from the age of eleven, on a
hillside tending goats. He got an A for intelligence, was
deemed fit to plead but there was a huge vacuum in his cultural
understanding . . . he could not give evidence because either his
answers or the questions asked were being misconstrued.62
2. Reliance on Low Intellectual Ability
The consultation paper states that one of the principal problems with
Pritchard is that it focuses on the intellectual abilities of the accused as
opposed to his or her capacity to make decisions.63 This results in a
disproportionate emphasis on cognitive ability. The U.K. Law Commission
reports that there has been a “good deal of academic criticism” of this failing
of the Pritchard criteria.64 One U.K. law review article argues that “these
nineteenth century criteria, which associate intellectual ability with insanity,
were fundamentally flawed from the beginning, blurring what had been a
well-recognized distinction between mental deficiency and madness.”65
The U.K. Law Commission was also concerned that the Pritchard
standard’s emphasis on ability to understand meant that it failed to take
capacity and participation into account as part of the legal test.66

60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id. ¶ 2.65(7).
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.70.
Id. ¶ 2.70.
Id. (citing Donald Grubin, What Constitutes Fitness to Plead, 1993 CRIM. L. REV. 748).
Id. ¶ 2.72.
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3. Lack of a Capacity Requirement
In an example case given by the U.K. Law Commission, an appellant
charged with murder and later found to be suffering from schizophrenia and
psychopathic disorders, was deemed fit to plead after being able to instruct
his representatives at the time.67 The U.K. Law Commission argues that
there is a “strong case” that this defendant should have been found unfit to
plead because his mental disorder meant that he lacked the “capacity to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of his or her legal position, even though
his or her understanding of the law and of legal process may be very good.”68
However, under the current standard for fitness, if the accused has an
understanding of the law, then they are fit to plead.69 Another example,
Murray,70 was discussed by the Commission for the purpose of illustrating
the anomaly occurring when an accused person can have a serious degree of
mental deficiency yet still be considered fit to plead. In Murray, the law did
not “make sufficient allowance for the fact that the defendant’s memory of
her thoughts and emotions at the time of the killing were such that she did
not wish to discuss them with anyone and simply wished to be punished for
what she saw as ‘murder.’ ”71 The Commission claims that the problem is
that the system does not have “any regard for the process by which a
defendant comes to the decision to plead guilty.”72
4. Lack of Effective Participation
Another problematic issue that arises in the context of capacity is whether
or not a defendant is able to participate effectively in his or her trial. The
Commission relies on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in
a criminal trial.73 The European Court of Human Rights’ cases provides
examples of effective trial participation. For example, an accused must be
able to consult with his or her lawyers and give them information sufficient
to conduct a defense.74 From this premise, the U.K. Law Commission
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. ¶ 2.75.
Id. ¶ 2.78.
Id.
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 1792.
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.81.
Id.
Stanford v. United Kingdom, 282 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 26 (1994).
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.102.
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derived the principle that effective participation is “active involvement on
the part of the accused rather than just a passive presence.”75
Participation is particularly important for those the Commission describes
as “vulnerable defendants.”76 The Commission indicated that it is the court’s
duty to ensure that these defendants, who are less effective participants due
to impairment, are analyzed and assessed correctly to make sure that a fair
trial is received.77 Specifically, the Commission recommends: (1) that there
be a greater coherence between effective participation and special measures;
and (2) a reformation of the legal test for unfitness to plead.78
In sum, the Commission proposes that a new legal test should be
developed to replace the current standard for fitness to plead.79
B. What the Pritchard Standard Should be Replaced with
1. The Decision-Making Capacity Test
The U.K. Law Commission believes the Pritchard standard should be
replaced with the decision-making capacity test. This is the test used by the
U.K.’s civil courts pursuant to the Mental Capacity Act of 2005.80 This
alternative test takes a “functional approach” to capacity.81 The test involves
analyzing a person’s ability to make a decision at a particular point in time,
not just the person’s ability to make decisions in general.82
The test as promulgated in the Mental Capacity Act looks at four different
factors: (1) can the defendant understand the information relevant to the
decisions that he or she will have to make in the course of his or her trial; (2)
can the defendant retain that information; (3) can the defendant use or weigh
that information as part of the decision-making process; and (4) can the
defendant communicate his or her decisions.”83 This evaluation is “issue
specific” meaning that a litigant could have multiple capacities regarding

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id.
Id. ¶ 2.103.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.106.
Id.
Mental Capacity Act, supra note 3.
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.4.
Id. ¶ 3.1.
Mental Capacity Act, supra note 3, § 3.
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different subjects.84 The concept of proportionality is also generally applied
to the capacity evaluation in civil contexts.85 The Commission believes that
this functional approach is preferable to a status86 or outcome87 approach to
capacity.
The Commission indicates that the decision-making capacity test
encompasses effective participation and that it would ensure that the
defendant in a criminal trial would be fairly evaluated. Although the U.K.
Law Commission does not believe every aspect of the civil system should be
adopted,88 for the most part it would fit within the criminal standard for
fitness to plead.
2. Provisional Proposals
a. Meaningful Participation
The U.K. Law Commission believes that in order for the accused to be
able to meaningfully participate in his or her trial, he or she must be able to
participate effectively.89 This is where a capacity-based test could help. The
concept of capacity is based on the ability to “do something.”90 The
decision-making capacity test could be formulated broadly enough to cover a

84
For example, a litigant may have the capacity to get married but lack the capacity to
consent to a medical procedure.
85
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.8 (stating that by “proportionality,” the
Commission means that the threshold of capacity varies depending on the decision which has
to be made. The more serious the possible consequences of the decision or the more complex
the issue which is the subject of that decision, the higher the threshold of capacity required.).
86
A status approach to capacity determination is based on whether or not the defendant is
diagnosed with a mental disorder or disability. If the defendant has a disorder, then he or she
is deemed to be unfit. If not, then they are fit. Id. ¶ 3.6.
87
An outcome approach is based on an assessment of the defendant’s decision and whether
that decision is inconsistent with conventional values or otherwise irrational. Id.
88
The U.K. Law Commission does not recommend that the principle of proportionality in the
civil system should be adopted in the criminal system for three reasons: (1) lack of certainty in
the procedure, (2) the method of dealing with a case once a person has been found to lack
capacity or to be unfit to plead differs in civil and criminal law, and (3) civil law and criminal
law are fundamentally different because of the role of sentencing in criminal law. Id. ¶ 3.9.
89
Id. ¶ 3.35.
90
Id. ¶ 3.36.
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variety of issues.91 This could help rectify prior problematic U.K. cases such
as R v. Moyle,92 R v. Diamond,93 and R v. Murray.94
Although those cases in particular refer to defendants with very severe
mental illnesses, the Commission suggests that the capacity-based test of
fitness should be broad enough to cover reasoning difficulties that can stem
from causes other than cognitive deficiency or mental illness.95 Psychiatric
professionals and legal scholars support this proposition.96 In an article
written by executives from the Mental Health Act Commission, the authors
suggest that a “sophisticated capacity test” must look beyond the question of
cognitive capacity and, “address the interplay between cognition (knowing),
emotion (evaluating) and volition (acting).”97 The article notes that a
person’s impairment of decision-making ability is often a result of
diminished or absent emotion such as embarrassment, sympathy and guilt.98
After considering these factors, the Commission submits “Provisional
Proposal 1,” which states: “The current Pritchard test should be replaced and
there should be a new legal test which assesses whether the accused has
decision-making capacity for trial. This test should take into account all the
requirements for meaningful participation in the criminal proceedings.”99
The benefits of this proposal include bringing the current U.K. fitness to
plead standard up to date with modern psychiatry. It also brings the criminal
test for capacity more in line with the civil test for capacity.100
91

Id. (such as pleas, what instructions to give, or whether to give evidence).
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 3059 (stating that the defendant in this case was found fit to plead
even though he had a history of psychiatric problems and diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia
at the time of trial).
93
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 923 (holding that if the defendant was found at the time of trial to
be fit then it is unnecessary to reexamine his mental condition, even if it is apparent to
everyone else that there is an issue as to whether his decision making is materially affected by
his mental condition). This is a problematic holding because a defendant could be delusional
yet fit to plead because he or she has some semblance of cognitive understanding. U.K. LAW
COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 2.86.
94
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 1792 at [5] (unreported) (stating that the evaluating psychiatrist
who deemed the defendant unfit to plead stated that psychiatry and the law in relation to
mentally ill defendants do not always sit together comfortably), available at http://www.
bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1792.html.
95
U.K. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 12, ¶ 3.38.
96
Id. (quoting Chris Heginbotham & Mat Kinton, Developing a Capacity Test for
Compulsion in Mental Health Law, 2007 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 72, 78).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. ¶ 3.41.
100
Id. ¶ 3.45.
92
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b. “Rational” Understanding
The Commission recognized that a number of legal and medical
professionals believe that there should not be a requirement of rationality in
the new capacity standard101 and noted that there is not an express
requirement in the Mental Capacity Act of 2005 that a litigant’s decision has
to be rational in order for a person to have the capacity to make that
particular decision102 as the focus under the Mental Capacity Act is on the
decision making process rather than the objective rationality of the
decision.103 The U.K. Law Commission rebuts this proposition by first
noting that, aside from the fact that “rationality” is a term that is vague and
lacks an agreed-upon meaning,104 a decision that may not be objectively
rational might be rational when the subjective context is considered.105
Furthermore, the Commission believes there is too much emphasis in the
U.K.’s jurisprudence on the decision itself and that there should not be a
“blanket requirement” that the accused must make a “rational” decision.106
Although the Commission does not emphasize rationality, it does not
disregard its importance. In fact, the Commission notes that the rationality of
a litigant’s decision could be relevant in the civil realm because the accused
is objectively irrational decision could “trigger the need for an assessment of
his or her decision-making capacity.”107
However, the Commission proposes that the new test in the criminal
realm “should not require that any decision the accused makes must be
rational or wise.”108
c. Unitary Construct v. Disaggregated Test
Once the Commission espoused the basic principles of the new, proposed
capacity-test, it explained the new test’s application. Two approaches were
considered: a traditional unitary construct and a disaggregated test.109 Both
101
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of these approaches stem from academic clinical literature addressing mental
fitness assessment.110 The unitary construct test is applied at the outset of the
litigation proceedings and determines the accused’s decision-making
capacity for all purposes in relation to trial.111 The advantages to this
comprehensive all or nothing test are its simplicity,112 uniformity,113 and
reliability.114
The disaggregated test can also be advantageous as it involves breaking
down the trial into particular sections for which decision-making capacity
would have to be assessed for each section.115 However, the Commission
rejects the disaggregated approach in favor of the unitary construct
approach.116
The main reasoning for the rejection stems from the complex, timeconsuming nature of the disaggregated test.117 Further, the Commission
believes that the traditional unitary construct is broad enough to consider the
range of abilities a defendant must possess for fair litigation.118 According to
the Commission, a “revised unitary test” would be sufficiently wide to
account for the possible variety of tasks required as part of trial.119 The
Commission proposes that the new legal test
should be a revised single test which assesses the decisionmaking capacity of the accused by reference to the entire
spectrum of trial decisions he or she might be required to make.
Under this test, an accused would be found to either have or to
lack decision-making capacity for the criminal proceedings.120
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d. Proportionality
As mentioned previously, a major concern with applying the current civil
standard in criminal cases is the issue of proportionality. If proportionality is
adopted as the criminal standard a defendant’s fitness to plead would depend
mostly on the “nature of the charge and complexity of the proceedings.”121
Due to potential practical difficulties translating this civil standard into
criminal law, the Commission does not believe that proportionality122 should
be adopted as the criminal fitness to plead standard for the following reasons:
(1) the potential uncertainty in the results yielded from a proportionality
standard; (2) the problem of reconciling inherent differences between civil
and criminal jurisdictions; and (3) the different roles of civil and criminal
sentencing.123
The Commission opines that the main problem with the application of the
civil proportionality standard is that applying proportionality in criminal
proceedings can lead to uncertain results. The threshold for capacity under
the proportionality approach depends on the “circumstances surrounding and
consequent to the particular decision,” based in part on the gravity and
complexity of the proceeding.124 However, it can be difficult to objectively
measure these circumstances especially in a criminal trial. The Commission
points out that “what is serious for one person may not be serious for
another.”125
The second problem in applying the proportionality standard to a criminal
context is found in the inherent differences of litigant capacity in civil versus
criminal litigation.126 For example, unlike in criminal law where the
emphasis is entirely on individual accountability, a civil litigant or defendant
who lacks capacity can still litigate via his or her litigation guardian.127 In
criminal law, if the defendant is found to lack capacity, “the trial shall not
proceed” and the focus of the litigation will shift towards figuring out the
defendant’s capacity and whether she had or had not done the act in
question.128
121
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The third major issue is the role sentencing plays in civil versus criminal
litigation. Sentencing, a major part of the criminal process, does not have a
role in the civil context.129 The Commission argues that, unlike in a civil
trial, where a person could potentially have the capacity to litigate and accept
an award but not have the capacity to later administer that award, separating
questions of sentencing from a criminal trial is not as simple.130
3. Commission’s Conclusions
In sum, the U.K. Law Commission proposes that the decision-making
capacity test should be the new legal test.131 It is a unitary test and should
take place at the outset of the proceedings.132 Although this proposal has
been met with some criticism, it has mostly been well received.133 Some
critics are skeptical of completely replacing the current standard. In
particular, R.D. MacKay, a legal scholar in the area of mental condition and
criminal law, stated his hesitation to abandon the Pritchard criteria.134 He
worries that if this new standard were adopted, a cognitive evaluation would
no longer exist in U.K.’s evaluation of fitness to plead.135 However, the
Commission does not suggest abandonment of cognitive evaluation. It
simply states that in addition to cognitive deficiency, the law would also
account for reasoning difficulties.136 The Commission states that under this
test, “an accused would be found to either have or to lack decision-making
capacity for all purposes in relation to his or her trial.”137 It also concluded
that proportionality should not have any role in the new decision-making
capacity test, due to the concerns of the unworkable differences between
criminal procedure and civil procedure.138
129
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V. PROBLEMS WITH THE DUSKY STANDARD AND THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE
U.S.
As discussed previously in Part II, competency to stand trial in the U.S. is
governed by the standard set forth in Dusky v. United States.139 This vague
standard has caused problematic and conflicting interpretations of how a
defendant should be evaluated for competency, especially in the realm of
self-representation.140 Instead of acknowledging the current standard’s
shortcomings, courts have tried to bend the Dusky standard in order to reach
just holdings. This has only caused more problems and has negatively
impacted U.S. jurisprudence in this area.
A. Confusing Interpretations in the Context of Self-Representation
The variable application of Dusky and the contradictory holdings in two
major self-representation cases (discussed below) have caused inconsistent
treatment of pro se mentally ill defendants.141
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Godinez v. Moran that the Dusky
standard is supposed to be a traditional, unitary construct.142 Specifically, the
Godinez Court stated that the standard for measuring a criminal defendant’s
competency to plead guilty or waive counsel is not higher than, or different
from, the competency standard for standing trial.143
After Godinez, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of mentally ill
defendants in Indiana v. Edwards.144 In Edwards, the Court held that the
Constitution permits judges to take into account and decide whether or not a
particular defendant is mentally competent enough to conduct his own
defense.145 Therefore, the court decided that the Constitution permits states
to insist upon representation by counsel for those who are competent enough
to stand trial, but who are incompetent to conduct trial proceedings by
139
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themselves.146 Edwards failed to reconcile the inherent conflict between its
holding and the Court’s holding in Godinez.
Legal scholars argue that the reasoning behind the Edwards decision was
based on the Court’s fear of embarrassing trials147 where a clearly
incompetent defendant chooses to represent himself at trial.148 Professor
Davoli, professor of criminal law at Florida Coastal School of Law, states
that, “startlingly, the Edwards Court acknowledged its discomfort with the
spectacle of mentally ill criminal defendants representing themselves, as well
as the inherent flaws of the Dusky competency standard.”149 The Edwards
court stated that the “application of Dusky’s basic mental competence
standard” could help avoid such a result, but that Dusky alone may not be
sufficient.150 The Court should have taken this opportunity to evaluate and
revise the standard for mental incompetence, but instead it chose to carve out
an exception to the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation for
defendants who suffer from mental illness.151 Professor Davoli argues that
the Court thus made it “more difficult for mentally ill criminal defendants to
waive counsel and represent themselves,” while making it “easier for courts
using the weak Dusky standard to declare individuals competent who may be
psychotic, delusional or hallucinating.”152
B. Flaws in the Dusky Standard
As mentioned above, the Edwards court acknowledged the shortcomings
of the Dusky standard. Some of the major issues with the Dusky standard are
its vagueness and its criteria for a determination of incompetence. Together
these two factors make the U.S. competency standard ineffective.
The Dusky standard states that courts must determine “whether [the
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
146
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reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”153
The requirement of “rational understanding” is one of the more
problematic phrases in the above noted test. As the U.K. Law Commission’s
consultation paper stated, “rationality is a term both in wide common use and
without any clear and fixed, agreed-upon meaning.”154 Because the term
“rational understanding” is so vague, it often does not account for the
contents of attorney-client communication.155 This means the mere fact that
communication occurs is enough to satisfy the Dusky test, no matter how
nonsensical the communication may be.156
This vagueness in the Dusky standard leads to problematic applications.
The case of Peter J. Troy is an example of this. Troy was convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after murdering a Roman
Catholic priest and a parishioner in a Long Island church.157 Troy was
diagnosed with schizophrenia and, although his lawyer requested that he be
declared incompetent, the judge blocked this request and allowed for him to
continue representing himself.158 The American Psychiatric Association, in
its manual of mental disorders, states that those who suffer from persecutory
types of delusional disorders are particularly inclined to focus on legal
remedies to perceived injustices.159 New York Post writer Jonathan Stanley
elaborated on the case of Peter Troy, stating that people with particularly
severe psychiatric disorders usually suffer from anosognosia, rendering them
“incapable of assessing their [own] condition.”160 In fact, Stanley, who was
diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, says that he did not believe he was sick and
“[n]either did nor does Peter Troy.”161 This is problematic because under the
153
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Dusky standard, a defendant who clearly has a mental disorder can still be
found competent. The defendant may be able to communicate in what a
judge would deem “rational” way, but still lack effective communication
with his or her lawyer.162
The defendant’s factual understanding also does not add much to this
vague standard. The appearance of having factual understanding is
comparable to an intellectual standard. This can be problematic as shown in
the Colin Ferguson trial described above.163 During Ferguson’s trial, the
New York Times described him as seeming to “savor his legal lexicon.”164
Using phrases like “[l]eading question, Judge. Counsel is leading the
witness,” he demonstrated a factual understanding for the criminal
proceeding before him.165 The practical problem with this application of a
“factual understanding,” standard is that it does not account for the mere
appearance of factual understanding. To outside observers of the courtroom,
Colin Ferguson may have seemed functioning, but many psychologists were
appalled by the judge’s decision to allow Ferguson to represent himself.166
VI. PROPOSAL
Studies have shown that at least 16% of inmates in jails and prisons have
a serious mental illness.167 Clearly, it is necessary to revise the Dusky
standard to make sure that defendants who are mentally ill are not deemed
competent when in fact they have cognitive or reasoning deficiency.
The competency standard should be brought up to date to reflect practical
realities in the modern trial world. Rather than a standard focused on the
162
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singular concept of rationality, the Dusky standard should be revised to
reflect the principles found in the decision-making capacity test proposed by
the U.K. Law Commission. The most important principles are those that
focus on the decision-making capacity of the defendant, the ability to
meaningfully participate in trial, and the principle that this test should be a
unitary construct as it was originally intended. These principles should be
used to help correct the ambiguity of the Dusky standard.
A. Decision-Making Capacity
The competency to stand trial standard should reflect the decision-making
capabilities of the defendant. The defendant should be found competent to
stand trial if the defendant can understand the information relevant to the
decisions needed for trial, retain that information, use or weigh that
information, and communicate his or her decisions. These four specific
criteria would help eliminate some of the vagueness found in lower court
opinions. A clear, specific standard would give guidance to the states and
inform future competency legislation. This would help alleviate some of the
problems associated with Dusky’s vagueness.
The focus should also not be on the “rationality” of a defendant’s
decision. As pointed out by the U.K. Law Commission, just because a
decision is objectively rational does not mean that the defendant is generally
rational. Focusing more on the decision-making capabilities of the
defendant, would eliminate the potential problem of judging defendants
based on the appearance of a reasonable decision.
B. Meaningful Participation
As argued in the U.K. Law Commission’s paper, capacity is based on the
ability to “do something.”168 The decision-making capacity test proposed by
the U.K. Law Commission would ensure that the test is read broadly enough
so that the defendant would be able to meaningfully participate in his or her
trial. The U.K. Law Commission states that under this test, the case of R v.
Moyle,169 referenced above, would be resolved more appropriately, as a
defendant who was diagnosed with schizophrenia would be found to be
incompetent at all trial levels. R v. Moyle is very factually similar to the
168
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Peter Troy case, as Troy was also diagnosed with schizophrenia and both
were still found competent. The adoption of a decision-capacity test that
recognizes meaningful participation could resolve cases where the defendant
is deemed competent when they are actually severely mentally ill.
C. Unitary Construct
Finally, and most importantly, the competency standard should be a
unitary construct as initially intended by Dusky.170 The advantages to this
construct include its legal simplicity, its uniformity, and its reliability.171
Having one test instead of splitting the capacity determination into different
tests for different stages of trial makes the task of determining competency
more efficient and more effective.
Not only would the uniform construct be more practical, the decisionmaking capacity test is broad enough to encompass all tasks necessary for
trial. Courts will have one detailed determination of both competency to
stand trial and competency to waive counsel.
Adopting a decision-making capacity test could be the first step in
improving the system of competence to stand trial. Although there are
ultimately things that would have to be adjusted based on differences in legal
systems, adopting the decision-making capacity test would not be too
difficult. Only standards, as opposed procedures would be changed. Under
the new standards, defendants will be evaluated and then compared to the
general standard to determine overall competence for all stages of the trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are many complex reasons why a defendant could or should be
found competent or incompetent. First, judicial and legislative systems in
the U.S. should ensure that competency standards are consistent with modern
psychiatric standards. The U.K. Law Commission should be commended for
recognizing and investing time in researching and identifying solutions to
ensure fairness when determining when a defendant is fit to plead.
The U.K.’s Pritchard standard is comparable in vagueness to that of the
U.S.’s Dusky standard. The U.K.’s guidelines are not necessarily nation
specific, but they provide criteria that incorporate modern psychiatry with a
170
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legal standard. The Dusky standard has been problematic since it was first
introduced in 1960. The Supreme Court’s interpretations have not clarified
the standard and have in fact confused the criteria for determining
competency. Due to its vague and ambiguous two prong standard, Dusky has
not provided sufficient guidance to the states and lower courts on how
exactly to determine competency, resulting in conflicting decisions and
opinions. If the standard in the U.S. is not changed, inconsistent applications
will persist, allowing defendants who should be deemed incompetent to be
found competent enough to waive counsel or stand trial.
By creating a uniform standard that details specific criteria important in
making a decision on competency, the U.S. can avoid further pitfalls with an
inconsistent application of Dusky and similar state statutes based on the
Dusky standard. This would increase the probability that the defendants
standing trial and waiving counsel are fit to do so.

